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OPINION
         
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
I.
Background
Three Lebanon County police officers appeal the District Court’s orders denying
their motions for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity.  We have
jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal.  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).
A.  The Drug Sales and Arrest
As we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we include only those facts that
are necessary for our disposition of the case.  While Detective Martin Barrett was driving
in Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, on June 12, 2002, on surveillance of controlled drug
purchases, he observed a confidential informant (“CI”) make a drug purchase from a man
the CI later identified as Peto.  Detective Barrett saw only the back and side of the dealer,
not the face.  Less than a week later, on June 18, 2002, Detective Todd Breiner observed
the same informant purchase drugs from the same individual, and on July 10 another
informant made another drug purchase, identifying the seller as Peto.  Breiner did not see
the drug dealer.  After these buys, Breiner conducted an investigation and learned that
“Peto was a nickname for a Samuel Ruiz who lived at 197 Lebanon Village, Lebanon,
Pennsylvania.”  Radwanski App. at 17a-18a.  
4On the basis of this information and the drug buys, the police officers collectively
prepared three criminal complaints, one for each transaction, and the officers prepared
three affidavits.  Each affidavit began, “[y]our affiants are” and listed three members of
the Lebanon County Detective Bureau/Lebanon County Drug Task Force, each of whom
then signed the corresponding affidavit.  Barrett & Breiner App. at 106a, 109a, 112a.  The
first affidavit was signed by Breiner and Detective Richard Radwanski, the second by
Breiner, and the third by Radwanski and Barrett.  Because the three affidavits are similar,
we will set forth the language of only the one analyzed by the District Court, which was
sworn October 11, 2002, and reads:
Your affiants are Sergeant Brett Hopkins, Detective Todd Breiner, and
Detective Sergeant Richard A. Radwanski, all members of the Lebanon
County Detective Bureau/Lebanon County Drug Task Force, Lebanon
County, Pa.  That your affiants have extensive training and experience in
the investigation of drug law violations and have been trained in the
administration of drug field testing.
On 10 Jul 02, at about 2044hrs, while in the 800 block of E. Crowell Street,
Lebanon City, Lebanon County, Pa, the defendant, Samuel Ruiz,
sold/delivered Cocaine, a schedule II controlled substance, and Heroin, a
schedule I controlled substance, to Lebanon County Drug Task Force/Drug
Enforcement Administration confidential informant #15-2001, in exchange
for the sum of $40.00.
Your affiants conducted chemical field tests on the suspected Cocaine and
Heroin.  These tests were positive, respectively, for Cocaine, a schedule II
controlled substance, and Heroin, a schedule I controlled substance.
That Samuel Ruiz arranged this Cocaine and Heroin delivery via the use of
a residential and/or cellular telephone.
Your affiants request a warrant of arrest be issued for the named defendant.
 Shortly thereafter, some of the officers went upstairs, and1
one of them searched Ruiz’s wife in an intensive and highly
personal manner.  At oral argument we were advised that the
officers involved in that search could not be identified.  This issue
is not before the court.
 Breiner and Barrett filed a joint motion.  After the District2
Court denied their motions, Radwanski filed his motion, which the
District Court denied based on the analysis it had used for the
Breiner and Barrett motion.  
5
Barrett & Breiner App. at 106a.
The three affidavits were presented to a Pennsylvania state district justice, who
issued a warrant for the arrest of Samuel Ruiz.  The warrant listed Ruiz’s address as 197
Lebanon Village, Lebanon, Pennsylvania.  However, when the police went to 197
Lebanon Village, they were told that Ruiz had moved to 63 North 12th Street.  When the
police arrived at the house at 63 North 12th Street, Ruiz was downstairs getting a bottle
for his son and the police threw him to the floor and handcuffed him.   He was taken to1
the police station, where he was eventually released when it was discovered he was not
the suspect in the drug sale.  In response, Ruiz and his wife filed this action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming, inter alia, Radwanski, Breiner, and Barrett as defendants. 
B. The Proceedings in the District Court
The defendants filed motions for summary judgment based on a defense of
qualified immunity,  asserting that they had conducted a reasonable investigation.  The2
District Court noted that the plaintiffs had responded to this motion by arguing that the
police had instead “conduct[ed] a negligent investigation and recklessly provid[ed]
6incorrect information in their affidavits of probable cause.”  Radwanski App. at 26a n.9. 
The District Court declined to consider those arguments on summary judgment because
the complaint did not allege negligent investigation or reckless provision of information.  
Instead, the Ruiz complaint alleged a lack of probable cause for the arrest (and
correspondingly the arrest warrant).  In ruling on the summary judgment motions, the
court thus analyzed the affidavits sworn by the officers to determine whether they
supplied a basis for probable cause.  Because that analysis provided a thorough textbook
primer of the applicable legal principle, we quote liberally from the District Court’s
opinion.
At the outset, the District Court noted that “[a]n affidavit of probable cause must
state facts showing [a] ‘fair probability’ that the proposed target of arrest engaged in
criminal activity.”  Radwanski App. at 27a (quoting Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 789
(3d Cir. 2000).  The Court continued, “[t]he contents of the affidavit should enable the
magistrate to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, considering the totality
of the circumstances, probable cause exists to arrest the person accused.”  Radwanski
App. at 27a (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 238 (1983)).
In light of the officers’ reliance on confidential informants, the District Court
stated that when “police rely on a confidential informant to provide some of the
information in an affidavit, the magistrate must be informed of 1) some of the underlying
circumstances supporting the informant’s story and 2) some of the underlying
 The District Court set out the law in terms of the3
magistrate as the impartial decisionmaker, although, in this case,
the warrants were presented to, and signed by, a state district
7
circumstances leading to the affiant’s conclusion that the informant may be believed.” 
Radwanski App. at 28a (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 231).  Such information should include
both “first-hand account[s] of illegal activity, supported by sufficient detail” and “the
facts of [the officer’s] own investigation that corroborate the illegal activity alleged by
[the] informant.”  Radwanski App. at 29a (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 226, 234 and United
States v. Ritter, 416 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2005).  
Turning to the affidavits underlying the warrants in this case, the District Court
found that there was an insufficient basis to establish probable cause to issue the arrest
warrant.  The court noted that the affidavits “set forth conclusory statements that Samuel
Ruiz committed the crimes cited therein.”  Radwanski App. at 33a.  While the affidavits
claimed they were “‘true and correct to the best of [each affiant’s] knowledge or
information and belief’[,] . . . none of the affidavits establish[ed] the factual basis for the
affiants’ knowledge or information and belief.”  Radwanski App. at 33a (emphasis and
first alteration in original).  In analyzing the affidavit quoted above, the District Court
stated:
The second and fourth paragraphs . . . are the sources of this affidavit’s
constitutional infirmity.  They state the affiants’ conclusion that Samuel
Ruiz sold drugs on the date and time identified, arranging the transaction by
telephone.  There are no facts or circumstances that would allow the
[district justice]  to draw the inference, as required by the Fourth3
justice.  There is no legal distinction for this purpose.
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Amendment - such as how the affiants came to know that the seller’s name
was Samuel Ruiz.
Radwanski App. at 34a.  The District Court continued:
Moreover, the affidavit states that a confidential informant purchased the
drugs from Samuel Ruiz.  It appears from the face of the affidavit that the
informant’s only involvement in this case was just that - the purchase.  The
affidavit fails to relate that the police relied on one or both informant’s
informal identification of the seller by the nickname “Peto” to begin their
investigation of the seller’s identity.
Radwanski App. at 35a.  
The District Court then held it was error for the officers to “fail[] to relate th[e]
operative fact” that part of the information had come from a confidential informant. 
Radwanski App. at 35a.  Along with this, the officers had “also failed to set forth any
factual support for the informant’s credibility, reliability, veracity, or basis of knowledge. 
They did not provide facts that would corroborate or confirm the informal identification
of the seller as ‘Samuel Ruiz.’”  Radwanski App. at 35a.  Having concluded that the
defendants’ affidavits “failed, as a matter of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, to provide
a substantial basis for the [district justice] to find probable cause to arrest,” the District
Court proceeded to consider whether the requirements for an affidavit of probable cause
were clearly established at the time the affidavits were sworn.  Radwanski App. at 36a. 
The Court spent little time on that issue because the right to be free of arrest
9without probable cause was clearly established at the time defendants submitted their
affidavits.  The Court noted that that right was established not only in the Fourth
Amendment, but also in cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, citing,
inter alia, Gates, 462 U.S. at 239, and this court’s decision in Orsatti v. N.J. State Police,
71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995).
Finally, the District Court looked at whether the officers had made an objectively
reasonable mistake, given the facts known to the officers when they swore to the
affidavits and viewing those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, as required
at this stage.  The District Court noted that this was not a case where the officers were
“faced with making a split-second decision in the ‘dangerous and complex world’ of law
enforcement.”  Radwanski App. at 37a (quoting Carswell v. Borough of Homestead, 381
F.3d 235, 244 (3d Cir. 2004)).  Indeed, the affidavits were not drafted until four months
after the events.  The District Court thus concluded that “it [was] well below the
standards of professionalism expected of police officers to issue such conclusory
affidavits as the three at bar,” which had “no facts . . . that allowed the issuing [district
justice] to make an independent link between the transaction for illegal drugs and
someone named Samuel Ruiz.”  Radwanski App. at 39a.
At oral argument, this court asked counsel for the officers whether they disagreed
with any statement of law or fact in the District Court’s opinion.  In response, counsel
was unable to point to any error. 
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It follows that we are unable to hold that the District Court erred as a matter of law
in denying qualified immunity to the officers at this stage of the proceedings.  Nothing
that we hold will preclude, however, the factfinder from deciding that the officers’
actions were objectively reasonable based on facts shown at a later point in this matter. 
We will therefore affirm the District Court’s orders denying the officers’ motions for
summary judgment.
